Bureaucratic Roadblocks
If you put the federal government in charge of the Sahara Desert, in five years there’d be a shortage of sand. — Milton Friedman
In 1930, construction began on the Empire State Building; it was completed one year and forty-five days later. Completed in 1936 after five years of construction, the Hoover Dam became the world’s largest. The George Washington Bridge was built in forty-nine months and was, at the time of completion in 1931, the longest suspension bridge in the world. For the 1939 World’s Fair, San Francisco built Treasure Island, a brand new island in the bay over a span of two years. The New York Subway opened twenty eight stations in 1904 after four and half years of construction. World Trade Center towers one and two were each built in four years and were, at the time of completion, the tallest buildings in the world.
That was then, this is now: It took the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) ten years to add three new stations to the New York City Subway. A desalination plant in Huntington Beach California was kept in bureaucratic limbo for twenty years, before it was finally denied for good in 2022. The Georgia Port Authority spent sixteen years waiting for environmental studies and agency approvals before it could even begin dredging the Savannah Port. The replacement to the Twin Towers, One World Trade Center, faced three years of planning and delays before eight years of construction. California’s high speed rail was approved by voters in 2008, fifteen years later not a single mile of track has been laid. The first line, from Merced to Bakersfield, is not expected to open until after 2030. Just to raise the deck of the already existing Bayonne Bridge required forty-seven permits, 5,000 pages, and four years of environmental assessments, taking the project ten years to complete.
We have been building massive structures in short amounts of time for more than a century but in recent decades these projects have taken longer to complete, while their costs balloon astronomically. Clearly this is not a matter of technological ability, there are no secrets to building roads, bridges, and skyscrapers, but there are plenty of bureaucratic and institutional roadblocks that stand in the way of progress.
Today in San Francisco you will be lucky to get a building permit approved in under two years. San Francisco is perhaps the most egregious offender when it comes to killing construction projects. The city has a toxic combination of rent control laws, strict zoning codes, and a lengthy permitting process, all of which create significant obstacles for new construction. It should not come as much of a surprise that the city consistently ranks among the worst in terms of housing affordability and availability.
According to data analyzed by the San Francisco Chronicle, in order to obtain a multifamily housing permit, applicants must wait 627 days. To be granted a single-family building permit takes even longer, 861 days. These are the median approval times, in other cases the delays have been much worse as the Chronicle explains, “In more than 270 projects approved since 2012, city reviewers took four years or longer to approve a permit. Thirty-four projects took eight years or longer.”
San Francisco’s building process is divided into six preliminary phases. These phases are described by the Chronicle:
Steps 1 and 2 involve preliminary project assessments (60 days) and project application filings (about 30 days) to the Planning Department that detail the overall housing project.
Steps 3 and 4 entail the preliminary application review (which takes about 90 days) [...] followed by any project refinements (typically another 30 days).
Step 5 is the final project analysis where comprehensive plan and design checks, and environmental reviews are conducted (which can take at least 180 days).
Finally, Step 6 is where after receiving an official project approval, the developer can apply for building permits to begin construction (but it can take over 600 days).
These policies have dramatic consequences on the price and quality of housing available in San Francisco. The price of San Francisco homes have increased more than anywhere else in the country, the median home price is nearing $2 million. This is true of apartments as well, despite the city’s rent control laws it has some of the most expensive rental housing in the country, with 500 square feet apartments renting for $3,000 per month. We should not find this surprising given how difficult it is to build new housing in San Francisco. Just as it is nearly impossible to create a new bank in the United States it is almost impossible to build new housing in the city. The domains are different but the results are the same---stagnation, decreased quality, and ever increasing prices due to an artificially limited supply.
Median real estate prices
U.S. dollars
Original series published with this essay.
Download dataSource series as published with the essay. Missing observations are not assigned values.
Housing in San Francisco, and California more broadly, are orders of magnitude more expensive than the rest of the country. This can be rationalized because California is a desirable place to live with good weather and lots of high paying jobs. However, not long ago the price of housing in California was very similar to the rest of the country. In the early 1970s, the median home price in California was only slightly above the U.S. median home price. The disconnect of California housing from the rest of the country only began to manifest when various zoning laws, environmental impact requirements, and open space restrictions started to be enacted.
These policies connect to innovation more broadly by placing limits on what can and cannot be built and the time frames in which they are allowed to happen. Like other sectors we will discuss in this section, it is not a matter of our technical or engineering capabilities. Constructing housing in San Francisco is not beyond our technical purview but it has been made illegal in almost every way imaginable.
The Tidewater Pipeline is a lesson from history on what incredible construction feats are possible in very short amounts of time. These lessons should broaden our perspectives to what is possible and turn our focus to the policies and regulations that stand in our way from such amazing progress. In 1878, the Tidewater Pipe Company was formed with an ambitious idea to transport oil via long distance pipelines. Prior to this, oil was transported primarily by rail car. Throughout the 1870’s Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company operated the vast majority of oil transported by a large railroad network. In order to create these pipelines, the enormous undertaking required the creation of larger diameter pipes and a new type of pump, strong enough to propel the oil over the mountains. The company built 130 miles of pipeline through the Allegheny Mountains in less than six months, it was the longest pipeline ever built at the time. On May 28th, 1879 more than two million liters of oil began flowing through the pipeline.
The Tidewater Pipe Company teaches us two important lessons. First, massive feats of engineering can be completed incredibly fast. Much like the construction of the Empire State Building, the 130 mile long oil pipeline was completed in record time. Second, the lack of regulation allowed new companies to directly challenge existing incumbents. If the brand new Tidewater Company had to receive regulatory approval, their fate would have been in the hands of regulators (many of whom would likely be under the persuasion of Standard Oil’s immense lobbying efforts). If our current regulatory apparatus existed in 1878, the company would have been filing permits, appealing zoning codes, and waiting for the results of an environmental impact study for many years.
Construction is not simply about housing or large impressive skyscrapers. These restrictive policies expand beyond our neighborhoods and cities. They determine what types of factories can be built, how much energy is produced, and what transportation options are available to people and goods. The policies ultimately determine what can be built, how long the projects take, and how expensive they become. They affect the level of infrastructure we have by restricting where developments can be erected and they also impact the resources and energy we are able to access.
Construction projects in other countries consistently emphasize the level of inefficiency that exists in the American building process. The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) reported the construction cost for building a factory in Arizona would be at least four times as much as the cost in Taiwan citing, “labor expenses, permits, regulatory compliance and inflation.” Another foreign company, the chemical supplier Chang Chun, claimed its construction cost in the United States was ten times what it was back home due to “regulations, building permits, and an insufficient supply of production materials.”
The cost and regulatory problems in construction extend to all types of projects in the United States, including basic infrastructure like roads and highways. A 2019 study from George Washington University reported the spending per mile on interstate construction quadrupled from 1960 through the early 1990s. After comparing worker wages, material costs, and geographic factors the study attributes the dramatic rise of costs to institutional changes that took place in the 1960s and 1970s. This time period saw the passage of the 1966 National Historic Preservation Act, creation of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970, 1972 Clean Water Act, and the 1973 Endangered Species Act. Each of these came with new bureaucracies and regulatory powers.
Environmental regulations have played a large part in delaying and blocking construction projects through a web of paperwork and litigation. There are more than 10,000 environmental assessments conducted each year. An assessment represents only the first step that determines whether a more involved environmental impact statement (EIS) is required. The 2022 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis reported an average preparation time for EIS of 1,533 days, that’s more than four years. Believe it or not that was an improvement from the 2021 average of 1,678 days. These delays are mandatory for any federal project and any private project that requires federal permits. These artificial roadblocks prevent construction, increase delays, and drive up costs, making innovation all but impossible.
There are issues in construction beyond environmental restrictions and cumbersome zoning laws, government run construction projects have been getting more expensive for years. The New York City subway system has been notorious for its high construction costs. The Second Avenue expansion was the most expensive subway construction project of all time. With the Phase 1 expansion costing roughly $2.5 billion per mile and the Phase 2 expansion estimated at over $4 billion per mile. Large government funded construction projects like these face the same level of regulatory hurdles just like private projects. However, the difference here is the decision making apparatus that is under entirely different incentives than typical ventures in the private sector.
As described in detail by the New York Times, the general playbook works as follows: labor unions drive up costs through agreements with construction companies who in turn upcharge public bureaucrats that face political incentives to accept those deals regardless of the over budget costs because the unions and contractors donate large campaign sums to get the politicians elected in the first place. The 2017 article explained:
[P]ublic officials have stood by as a small group of politically connected labor unions, construction companies and consulting firms have amassed large profits. Trade unions [...] have secured deals requiring underground construction work to be staffed by as many as four times more laborers than elsewhere in the world, documents show. Construction companies, which have given millions of dollars in campaign donations in recent years, have increased their projected costs by up to 50 percent when bidding for work from the M.T.A.
The Times reported that for 150 contracts worth $10 million or more, each project received only 3.5 bids on average. Not only are these projects getting more expensive over time but they cost much more than similar projects in other parts of the world. An extensive study from New York University found that the Phase 1 extension was ten times as expensive as similar projects in other countries. We have been building subway systems in this country for over one hundred years, one would expect these projects to improve in speed and cost as newer technologies are developed and generational knowledge about these projects is gained. Unfortunately, the incentive structures cultivated by regulations and self interested politicians prevent innovative market forces from these advancements.
Oil was first discovered in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska in 1968. Due to legal and environmental delays oil was not pumped from the field until 1977. When it was finally allowed to operate, the field produced 2 million barrels of oil per day. The OPEC oil embargo of 1973, by comparison, removed roughly 4 million barrels per day from the global market. The devastating effects of the embargo could have been cut in half by Prudhoe Bay alone, if it had been allowed to operate. The almost decade-long delay imposed on the Trans-Alaska pipeline produced the obvious consequence of skyrocketing oil prices during the crisis, as oil prices went from $2.90 a barrel before the embargo to $11.65 per barrel in January of 1974.
What is much harder to measure is the unseen consequences of those higher prices. Money was diverted from alternative uses to pay for more expensive gas. Much like the price of steel in the opening story, rising gas prices affect more than just first order consumers. Higher gas prices lead to higher transportation costs which in turn raises the price of shipping. As a result, it becomes more expensive to power machinery, operate factories, and create products. When it becomes more expensive to produce and transport goods, individuals and companies have less money left over to invest in new projects, which reduces innovation at large.
Construction projects face a myriad of challenges from government regulations such as environmental policies, political back scratching arrangements, zoning restrictions, and exploding costs. These roadblocks affect both private construction projects as well as federally funded ones. They divert time and resources to wasteful processes that dramatically slow down construction projects and increase costs. Infrastructure projects are an essential piece to a modern nation, especially one that should be focused on technological advancement. We need faster and cheaper transportation through more roads, bridges, trains, and airports.
The key to addressing construction stagnation is through regulatory reform. We must remove the artificial roadblocks that lead to long delays and skyrocketing prices. More precisely, the size and scope of environmental assessments and impact studies must be rolled back. A concrete and attainable reform is to place time limits on environmental studies. Such a constraint forces agencies to promptly respond and removes temporal ambiguity for builders, making clear how long they can be expected to wait. Spending more than four years simply determining the environmental effects of construction projects is untenable.
Delays do not just postpone projects but are actively destructive by imposing additional costs and preventing viable alternatives from being implemented. Unpredictable delays caused by the permitting process or regulatory scrutiny drive up costs by requiring increased capital investments, as the current assets are frozen while projects wait in bureaucratic limbo. A 2015 report found that delays on construction projects cost the United States over $3.7 trillion. Uncertainty about regulatory decisions also comes with costs, when outcomes are uncertain the safest course of action is not to play.
Another avenue for reform is to streamline decision making both within the Federal Government and at a local level. Democracy is a noble ideal but it can be disastrous for construction projects where every citizen can voice their opposition, as in the case of San Francisco. At the federal level this can be achieved by removing regulatory redundancy and not allowing every agency to chime in and require approval. We must look to our past for examples on limiting regulatory burdens. Our goal should be to build faster, cheaper, and bigger every year. Agencies like the EPA deliberately stand in the way.
To conclude this section, let’s take a step back to examine where we’ve been. We began with a microscopic view of one city’s housing policies. Those policies make it extraordinarily time consuming and costly to build anything in San Francisco. The consequence of those policies is to artificially limit the supply of housing which increases its cost. When similar policies are applied at a larger scale the effects are magnified because of their broader impact in the economy. This was demonstrated by examining larger scale construction projects like subways, oil pipelines, and interstate highways.
If we could build a record pipeline in 1879 and the Empire State building in one year, we should be capable of much more today. Getting back to the future requires more roads, bridges, pipelines, buildings, and factories. The more we restrict and regulate construction, the more expensive and prolonged these projects become, pushing the future further out of reach.
This article has been adapted from the book Back to the Future: How to Reignite American Innovation.